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Research suggests that spatial navigation relies on the same neural network as episodic memory, episodic
future thinking, and theory of mind (ToM). Such findings have stimulated theories (e.g., the scene
construction and self-projection hypotheses) concerning possible common underlying cognitive capac-
ities. Consistent with such theories, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by concurrent
impairments in episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM. However, it is currently unclear
whether spatial navigation is also impaired. Hence, ASD provides a test case for the scene construction
and self-projection theories. The study of spatial navigation in ASD also provides a test of the extreme
male brain theory of ASD, which predicts intact or superior navigation (purportedly a systemizing skill)
performance among individuals with ASD. Thus, the aim of the current study was to establish whether
spatial navigation in ASD is impaired, intact, or superior. Twenty-seven intellectually high-functioning
adults with ASD and 28 sex-, age-, and IQ-matched neurotypical comparison adults completed the
memory island virtual navigation task. Tests of episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM
were also completed. Participants with ASD showed significantly diminished performance on the
memory island task, and performance was positively related to ToM and episodic memory, but not
episodic future thinking. These results suggest that (contra the extreme male brain theory) individuals
with ASD have impaired survey-based navigation skills—that is, difficulties generating cognitive maps
of the environment—and adds weight to the idea that scene construction/self-projection are impaired in
ASD. The theoretical and clinical implications of these results are discussed.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, episodic memory, episodic future thinking, spatial navigation,
theory of mind
Spatial navigation refers to the ability to find one’s way around
an environment. It is a skill that is essential for everyday func-
tioning, and one that we use all the time, whether we are following
a familiar route from the living room to the kitchen to make a cup
of tea, or finding the way back to the novel location of our parked
car after a day out shopping. Navigation involves maintaining a
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sense of direction and location while moving around the environ-
ment, and can be supported by external representations, such as
maps, or by internal mental representations based on sensory
experience (Wolbers & Hegarty, 2010). This latter type of navi-
gation is the focus of the current article.
Researchers have identified several alternative navigation strat-
egies in humans, including route-based and survey-based strategies
(Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). Route-based navigation relies
on gradually learned, inflexible, egocentric representations of spe-
cific sequences of landmarks, junctions, and so forth. This is the
type of strategy that we typically rely on when following familiar
routes, such as traveling from home to work, or from the living
room to the kitchen. On the other hand, survey-based navigation
relies on flexible, allocentric representations, or cognitive maps
(Tolman, 1948), of the layout of the environment. This is the type
of strategy that we adopt when familiar route following is not
possible. For example, if one’s normal route from home to work is
blocked due to road works, one has to consider the layout of the
wider environment (referring to one’s cognitive map) to success-
fully plan and execute an alternative route. These two navigation
strategies appear to have unique underlying brain bases, with
route-based and survey-based strategies depending on the caudate
and hippocampus, respectively (Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Bur-
gess, 2003).
Theories of the Underlying Neurocognitive
Basis of Navigation
Navigation is thought to be underpinned by several cognitive
abilities, including long-term memory (Spiers & Maguire, 2008).
Whereas route-based navigation tends to be based on (implicit)
procedural memory, survey-based navigation depends on (explicit)
declarative memory (Gillner & Mallot, 1998). In addition to the
widely accepted role of declarative memory, two recently devel-
oped theories make more specific and novel proposals regarding
the neurocognitive underpinnings of survey-based navigation.
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, and Maguire (2007) have proposed
that navigation depends on a more basic cognitive process, termed
scene construction—the ability to mentally generate and maintain
coherent, multimodal spatial representations, which involves bind-
ing together multiple elements of an imagined scene, including
contextual details such as sounds, smells, feelings, thoughts, peo-
ple, and objects. This process is said to rely on a network centered
on the hippocampus. In addition to underpinning navigation, scene
construction is also said to underpin episodic memory (the ability
to mentally reexperience past episodes) and episodic future think-
ing (the ability to mentally preexperience possible future epi-
sodes).
An alternative theory has been put forward by Buckner and
Carroll (2007), who propose that navigation depends on the ca-
pacity for self-projection, which they define as the ability to shift
from one’s current perspective to alternative perspectives. Specif-
ically, it is claimed that navigation “involves simulating another
view or mapping the environment,” which requires shifting “from
the present perspective to a simulated model of an alternative
world” (p. 51). According to Buckner and Carroll, self-projection
is also essential for episodic memory and episodic future thinking.
In this respect, the scene construction and self-projection hypoth-
eses are overlapping. The self-projection theory departs from the
scene construction theory, however, in claiming that the ability to
represent others’ mental states (an aspect of theory of mind [ToM])
requires self-projection.
The key prediction emerging from these theories is that navi-
gation abilities should be positively correlated with episodic mem-
ory, episodic future thinking, and (according to the self-projection
hypothesis only) ToM, because all of these abilities depend on the
same underlying mechanism/process. Thus, observation of disso-
ciations between these abilities would provide a significant chal-
lenge to these theories. Such a challenge may come from the case
of autism spectrum disorder (ASD).
ASD: A Possible Test Case for Theories of the
Neurocognitive Underpinnings of Navigation
ASD is a developmental disorder characterized by impairments
in social communication and interaction and restricted and repet-
itive behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). At the
cognitive level, ASD is characterized by impairments in episodic
memory and episodic future thinking (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind
& Williams, 2012; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2013; but see
Crane, Lind, & Bowler, 2013), as well as ToM (Happé, 1995).
Thus, individuals with ASD exhibit impairments in two of the
three abilities said to rely on scene construction and three of the
four abilities said to rely on self-projection.
Thus, existing evidence is consistent with the idea that scene
construction and/or self-projection are impaired in ASD. This has
led us to propose that at least part of the cognitive profile in ASD
may be the consequence of underlying deficits in the capacity for
scene construction and/or self-projection (Lind & Williams, 2012).
If our hypothesis is correct—and, more widely, if the scene con-
struction or self-projection theories are correct—we should also
expect to find impairments in survey-based navigation in ASD.
However, our prediction stands in contrast to that arising from
a prominent theory of the etiology of ASD, namely, the extreme
male brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002). According to this theory,
individuals with ASD represent extreme cases of the “male brain”
type. The concepts of empathizing and systemizing are central to
this theory. Here, empathizing refers to “the drive to identify
another person’s emotions and thoughts, and to respond to these
with an appropriate emotion,” whereas systemizing refers to “the
drive to analyze the variables in a system to derive the underlying
rules that govern the behavior of a system” (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p.
248). It is claimed that empathizing is superior to systemizing in
neurotypical female brains, whereas the reverse is true in neuro-
typical male brains. In support of this empathizing–systemizing
theory of psychological sex differences, Baron-Cohen, Knick-
meyer, and Belmonte (2005) explicitly use the example of sex
differences in navigation ability. A substantial literature has shown
that males of several species (including humans) outperform fe-
males on tests of spatial navigation (Dabbs, Chang, Strong, &
Milun, 1998; Jones, Braithwaite, & Healy, 2003). Baron-Cohen et
al. (2005) highlight that “male rats perform significantly better
than females do on the radial arm [maze] and Morris water maze,”
that “human males also commit fewer errors and require less time
to complete a ‘virtual’ maze,” and that “such differences reflect
stronger systemizing in males” (pp. 819–820). Indeed, Baron-
Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, and Wheelright’s (2003)
self-report Systemizing Quotient, which purportedly measures sys-
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temizing, includes several items relating to spatial navigation (e.g.,
“I find it difficult to learn my way around a new city”). Thus,
spatial navigation is seen as a prototypical example of a sexually
dimorphic skill (favoring males) that requires systemizing. As
such, if people with ASD have extreme male brains, and are thus
hypersystemizers, they should show intact or superior navigation
skills.
Previous Research on Navigation in ASD
To our knowledge, only three previous studies have directly
explored navigation ability in ASD. However, each suffers from
limitations that restrict the conclusions that can be drawn from
them.
In the first of these studies, Prior and Hoffman (1990) reported
a significant impairment on a computerized corridor maze task
among 12 children and adolescents with ASD. However, the ASD
group in this study had a significantly lower mean performance IQ
than either of the two comparison groups. Given that nonverbal
intelligence is a key factor in determining navigation performance,
this lack of matching makes it difficult to determine whether
diminished maze task performance resulted from ASD-specific
navigation impairments or merely the overall lower nonverbal
intelligence of the ASD group.
In the second study, Caron, Mottron, Rainville, and Chouinard
(2004) reported intact or superior navigation among 16 adolescents
and adults with ASD using corridor maze tasks. However, for four
of their six experiments, no means, standard deviations, or infer-
ential statistics (e.g., F, t, p, or effect-size values) were reported for
between-groups differences, making it is difficult to interpret the
results confidently.
More recently, Edgin and Pennington (2005) reported intact
virtual water maze performance among 24 children with ASD.
However, this finding may be attributable to the fact that the
male-to-female ratio was significantly higher in the ASD group
than the comparison group. Given that males generally show an
advantage on spatial navigation tasks, ASD-specific deficits in
navigation may have been masked in this study, because the higher
proportion of males in the ASD group artificially inflated naviga-
tion performance relative to the female-dominated comparison
group.
Thus, at present, the evidence from the only study of navigation
in ASD among appropriately matched groups (Caron et al., 2004)
does not support the view that this ability is diminished (although
incomplete reporting of data by Caron et al. makes conclusions
tentative, at best). However, more general task-related limitations
apply to each of the existing studies of navigation in ASD, making
firm conclusions about survey-based navigation in this disorder
difficult to draw.
Methodological Limitations of Corridor Maze and
Simple Virtual Water Maze Tasks
The studies of navigation in ASD by Prior and Hoffman (1990)
and Caron et al. (2004) each used corridor maze paradigms.
Although such tasks provide unambiguous measures of route-
based (caudate-centered) navigation strategies, it has been argued
that they cannot be used as measures of survey-based
(hippocampal-centered) strategies, because they can be executed
using procedurally memorized sequences of turns, or stimulus–
response associations, rather than topographical knowledge of the
layout of an environment (Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002).
Hence, aside from the limitations already discussed, corridor maze
studies provide minimal information about survey-based naviga-
tion and have little bearing on the scene construction and self-
projection theories.
Furthermore, concerns have been expressed regarding the ap-
propriateness of water-maze-type tasks for use in humans. For
example, Burgess et al. (2002) highlight the fact that highly
simplistic virtual room environments, such as the one used in
Edgin and Pennington’s (2005) study, lack texture (e.g., land-
marks), meaning the entire environment is visible from any given
vantage point. Hence, it is possible to succeed on such tasks via
“simple visual pattern matching” (p. 628) without survey knowl-
edge. Moreover, such simple environments lack a sense of immer-
sion. Arguably, such tasks are so far removed from real-life
navigation scenarios that they give us a limited picture of naviga-
tion abilities.
The Current Study: Hypotheses and Predictions
The current study employed the memory island navigation par-
adigm, which involves a realistic, large-scale, virtual island envi-
ronment, where task success depends on survey-based navigation
strategies. This paradigm has been used in several previous studies
of adults and children (e.g., Piper, Acevedo, Craytor, Murray, &
Raber, 2010; Rizk-Jackson et al., 2006). In this task, participants
use a joystick to find their way to several target objects positioned
in different locations on the island. During an initial visible phase,
participants complete several trials in which target object locations
are indicated by large, easily visible flags. This phase provides an
opportunity to construct a cognitive map of the environment and to
learn the locations of the target objects. Here, it is possible to
succeed using a locomotor guidance strategy—an online process
that does not rely on survey-based navigation or long-term mem-
ory—that allows one to travel to a visible beacon (such as a tall
building or, in this case, a flag) that can be kept in constant view
(Foo, Warren, Duchon, & Tarr, 2005). Hence, performance during
this phase indexes participants’ baseline ability to cope with ex-
traneous, noncentral task demands, such as comprehension of task
instructions and proficiency with the joystick. This phase is im-
mediately followed by the hidden (experimental) phase in which
participants complete several trials in which flag markers are no
longer used. Here, participants must rely solely on their cognitive
map of the environment and their memory for the location of the
target object—performance depends on survey-based navigation.
Like a traditional water maze, the island consists of four quad-
rants, each of which is assigned a unique target object. However,
unlike in most virtual water maze tasks, it is not possible to
succeed through simple visual pattern matching because the envi-
ronment is richly textured, with numerous buildings, trees, and
other landmarks (thus, only a restricted portion of the landscape is
visible from any given viewpoint). Virtual navigation tasks, such
as the memory island task, are widely considered to provide a valid
index of real-world navigation skills (Maguire, Burgess, &
O’Keefe, 1999). Although there are notable differences between
virtual and real-world tasks (e.g., in virtual tasks, the field of view
is smaller and vestibular/proprioceptive information is unavail-
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able), the cognitive maps that people develop in each context are
remarkably similar (Ruddle, Payne, & Jones, 1997).
If the scene construction or self-projection hypotheses are cor-
rect, participants with ASD should perform significantly less well
than comparison participants on hidden trials but not visible trials.
This would indicate specific difficulties with survey-based navi-
gation. In contrast, if the extreme male brain theory of ASD is
correct, participants with ASD should show intact or superior
performance on the hidden trials, reflecting strong survey-based
navigation ability. Thus, the analysis of between-group differences
in memory island performance provides a key opportunity for
distinguishing between these theoretical positions. However, fur-
ther (and more fine-grained) opportunity to distinguish between
the scene construction and self-projection theories is provided by
analysis of the cognitive correlates of memory island task perfor-
mance.
The data presented here were collected as part of a larger study
to explore the underlying basis of (a) deficits in episodic memory
and episodic future thinking in ASD, and (b) predicted deficits in
navigation in ASD. The episodic memory and episodic future
thinking data are reported in Lind et al. (2013), which also reports
data from a ToM task. Given the strong theoretical links between
navigation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM,
we were interested in exploring the relation between performance
on the memory island task and performance on these three tasks.
We do not repeat the basic findings (i.e., between-groups differ-
ences) from these tasks here. Instead, we report only specific
analyses concerning within-group relations between navigation,
episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM, which have
not been reported elsewhere.
If the scene construction theory is correct, we should observe
significant positive correlations between navigation and episodic
memory and episodic future thinking, but not between navigation
and ToM. On the other hand, if the self-projection hypothesis is
correct, we should expect to see significant positive correlations
between navigation and episodic memory, episodic future think-
ing, and ToM.
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD
(21 men) and 28 neurotypical comparison adults (21 men) partic-
ipated. Participants in the ASD group had received formal diag-
noses of autistic disorder (n  5) or Asperger’s disorder (n  22),
according to the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association,
2000). All participants were free from neurological/psychiatric
disorders other than ASD.
Several measures were used to assess current ASD features
among participants with ASD, and ASD-like features among com-
parison participants. First, 19 of 27 participants with ASD com-
pleted Module 4 of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule–
Generic (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). ADOS assessments were
conducted by trained individuals who had achieved research-level
scoring reliability. Eight participants with ASD were unwilling to
complete an assessment. All participants who completed the
ADOS met the ASD cutoff (7 points).
Second, all participants completed the Autism-Spectrum Quo-
tient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Club-
ley, 2001). All comparison participants scored below the ASD
cutoff on the AQ (26 points; Woodbury-Smith, Robinson,
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005). All but three participants
with ASD scored above the ASD cutoff on the AQ, and each of
those three scored above the cutoff on the ADOS.
Finally, a relative or long-standing friend of each participant
completed the Social Responsiveness Scale, second edition
(SRS-2; Constantino & Gruber, 2012). Due to the lack of an
appropriate or willing informant, SRS-2 data could not be obtained
for two participants with ASD and two comparison participants.
All comparison participants scored below the ASD cutoff (60
points) on the SRS-2. Only two participants with ASD missed the
ASD cutoff on the SRS-2 and both scored above the cutoff on the
ADOS.
Participant characteristics are presented in Table 1. The groups
were matched closely for verbal and nonverbal ability (assessed by
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999),
age (see Table 1 for matching statistics), and sex ratio, 2(1, N 
55)  0.06, p  .808,   .03. Ethical approval was obtained from
the appropriate research ethics committees. All participants gave
written, informed consent, and all were paid for participation.
Materials and Procedure
Memory island navigation task. Participants were asked to
navigate within a computer-simulated, three-dimensional, island
environment, measuring 347  287 m (see Figure 1 for screen-
shots). The task was presented on an RM desktop personal com-
puter with a 22-in. LG TFT monitor, and included not only a visual
Table 1
Participant Characteristics (Means, Standard Deviations, and Inferential Statistics for Between-Group Differences)
Characteristic ASD (n  27) Comparison (n  28) t p d
Age (years) 34.64 (12.97) 33.02 (16.40) 0.41 .687 0.11
VIQ 109.78 (15.23) 112.71 (12.21) 0.79 .433 0.21
PIQ 110.89 (16.33) 113.89 (12.56) 0.61 .546 0.21
FSIQ 111.33 (15.95) 113.89 (11.17) 0.69 .492 0.19
AQ 34.15 (8.61) 12.11 (5.03) 11.54 .001 3.12
SRS-2 96.96 (31.32) 18.77 (19.36) 10.67 .001 3.00
ADOS-G 11.11 (2.81)
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; VIQ  verbal IQ; PIQ  performance IQ; FSIQ  full scale IQ; AQ  Autism Spectrum Quotient; SRS-2 
Social Responsiveness Scale, 2nd Edition; ADOS-G  Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic.
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(full color) depiction of the surroundings, including buildings and
other landmarks, but also accompanying nature sounds (presented
via Creative 265 external speakers), such as birdsong and moving
water. Participants sat at a comfortable distance from the screen
(50 cm).
Participants could explore the virtual environment using a Mi-
crosoft Sidewinder joystick, which allowed them to determine
their direction and speed of travel. At the outset of the task,
participants were presented with the following on-screen instruc-
tions (in addition to verbal instructions from the experimenter):
You will cruise on a virtual island. In each trial, you will start in the
same position, but you may be looking in a different direction. Your
mission is to find a mysterious object hidden somewhere on the island.
To do that you need to look closely at what’s on the island. Try to
make a map in your head of the island and where the mysterious
objects are located on the island. If you cannot find the mysterious
object within two minutes, an arrow will help guide you to it. Once
you have found it, you must stand next to it and wait for the game to
end.
Visible condition. During the first phase of the task, partici-
pants completed four visible trials. In this condition, target items
were marked by large flags, which could be clearly seen from a
considerable distance. Across visible Trials 1, 2, 3, and 4, the
target objects were a sculpture, seal, seagull, and fountain, respec-
tively (corresponding to D, E, F, and C, respectively in Figure 1).
Each target was assigned a unique location. On a given trial, only
one target was visible. At the outset of each trial, participants were
instructed to locate the flag and move toward it to find the target
object. If they were unable to locate it within 2 min, an arrow
appeared to direct them to it. Once the object was found, the
participant was required to stand next to it, and the word “Remem-
ber” appeared on the screen, prompting them to try to memorize its
location.
Hidden condition. The visible phase was immediately fol-
lowed by the hidden phase, comprising four hidden trials. In this
condition, no flag markers were present, and participants were
required to find their way to the same target object (sculpture) on
each trial (the location was identical to the visible trial). The
repeated use of the same target across hidden trials provided
participants with continued opportunity for learning (protecting
against floor effects). The target object was indicated to the par-
ticipant, in the form of an on-screen visual image, at the outset of
each trial. As for visible trials, if a participant was unable to locate
the target object within 2 min, an arrow appeared to direct them to
it.
For both visible and hidden trials, the starting location was
always the center of the island. The starting orientation was varied
across trials, but these variations remained constant across partic-
ipants. In other words, participants started each trial facing a
different direction—a feature of the task, designed to eliminate
route-based strategies. Target locations were kept constant for all
participants. The time taken to complete the task varied according
to how quickly participants completed each trial (10 to 15 min for
most participants). The experimenter remained present throughout.
Dependent measures. Participants’ movements were recorded
in time-stamped coordinate files. Several dependent variables were
calculated for each trial, including
1. Proportion of time spent within the target quadrant. This
is the most commonly used performance measure on
water-maze-type navigation tasks. If a participant has
successfully learned the location of the target object, he
or she should spend more time searching in the correct
quadrant. Hence, higher scores indicate better perfor-
mance and more efficient routes.
2. Latency to reach the target (s). This simply provides a
measure of how long it takes a participant to reach the
target object.
3. Proportion of successful trials. This provides the most
basic indicator of task performance. Successful trials
were defined as trials in which the target was located
within 2 min (i.e., before the arrow appeared on screen to
direct the participant to the target object).
4. Velocity (virtual units/s). This is not a measure of task
success itself, but several other dependent variables de-
pend, to some extent, on velocity. These variables in-
clude proportion of successful trials (it is more difficult to
reach the target within 2 min if one is traveling slowly)
and latency (if one is traveling quickly, one should be
able to reach the target object in a shorter time). By
contrast, proportion of time spent in the target quadrant is
Figure 1. Screenshots from the memory island navigation task (A and B
show the same view as it appeared in the visible and hidden conditions of
the experiment, respectively; C, D, E, and F show the target objects used
during the visible trials; D shows the target object used for the hidden
trials).
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immune to the confounding effect of velocity. Hence, it
is the purest measure of task success.
5. Path length (virtual units). In general, shorter paths indi-
cate more efficient navigation—if an individual knows
where they are going, they can travel directly there.
However, it is important to note that, although this mea-
sure is independent of velocity, path length is not the
optimal performance measure because shorter paths do
not necessarily indicate task success (i.e., locating target
within 2 min).
Data were not analyzed on a trial-by-trial basis because starting
orientation (which varied across trials) influences the level of
difficulty and would have confounded the results. Thus, for the
purpose of data analysis, performance was collapsed across the
four visible and four hidden trials, respectively. Average scores,
rather than total scores, for each condition were used throughout
(to aid comparisons with previous studies).
In the current article, we report results from each of the depen-
dent measures described, in keeping with previous studies involv-
ing the memory island paradigm. However, the key measure of
navigation ability is proportion of time spent in the target quadrant
on hidden trials. Indeed, this is arguably the optimal measure of
survey-based navigation from this task among people with ASD.
As stated, proportion of time spent in the target quadrant is the
only performance measure that is independent of velocity. This is
particularly relevant when considering performance among indi-
viduals with ASD, as ASD is characterized by lower processing
efficiency (Williams, Boucher, Lind, & Jarrold, 2013) and slower
performance across a diverse range of cognitive tasks (Bowler,
1997; Sachse et al., 2013; Schmitz, Daly, & Murphy, 2007). Thus,
it is highly likely that individuals with ASD will travel at lower
velocity than comparison participants in the memory island task,
and consequently show longer latencies and a lower proportion of
successful trials. However, this would reflect generally reduced
processing efficiency, rather than specific problems with spatial
navigation. By focusing on proportion of time spent in the target
quadrant, we are providing the most stringent and conservative test
of survey-based navigation ability in ASD.
Episodic memory/episodic future thinking task. The epi-
sodic memory and future thinking task was based on Hassabis et
al. (2007). Participants were presented with cue cards (e.g., “How
you spent your last birthday,” “Something you will be doing this
weekend”) and asked to remember several past personal experi-
ences (assessing episodic memory) and imagine several future
personal experiences (assessing episodic future thinking), and de-
scribe these to the experimenter. For each description, a composite
experiential index score was calculated (range  0 to 60). This
provides a measure of how rich and detailed each description was.
These scores were averaged across the past and future conditions,
respectively, with higher scores indicating better episodic memory
or future thinking. For full details of the method, see Lind et al.
(2013).
ToM task. ToM was assessed using the animations task
(Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000), which requires participants to
describe interactions between two triangles, as portrayed in a series
of silent video clips. Four of the clips were intended to evoke
mentalistic descriptions involving the attribution of mental states,
such as belief, intention, and deception (mentalizing or ToM
condition), and four were intended to evoke physical descriptions,
involving the attribution of physical agency (physical or control
condition). Descriptions were assigned scores of 0, 1, or 2 accord-
ing to their level of accuracy. Therefore, within each condition, the
maximum score was 8 points. For full details of the method see
Lind et al. (2013). The animations task was employed because,
unlike other classic measures of ToM (e.g., false belief tasks), it is
sensitive to ToM impairments among intellectually high-
functioning individuals with ASD, and variation in ToM skills
among neurotypical individuals (e.g., Castelli, Frith, Happé, &
Frith, 2002; Williams et al., 2013).
Data Analysis
A standard alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical
significance. All reported significance values are for two-tailed
tests (except those associated with correlation analyses, in which
directional hypotheses were made). When ANOVAs or t tests were
used, we report r (.10  small; .30  moderate: .50  large;
Cohen, 1969) or Cohen’s d (.20  small; .50  moderate;
.80  large; Cohen, 1969) values as measures of effect size.
Results
Memory Island Navigation Task Performance
Proportion of time spent in the target quadrant. Proportion
of time spent in the target quadrant was analyzed using a 2 (group:
ASD, comparison)  2 (condition: hidden, visible) mixed-design
ANOVA. This revealed a nonsignificant main effect of group, F(1,
53)  1.90, p  .174, r  .19, a significant main effect of
condition, F(1, 53)  4.71, p  .034, r  .29, reflecting poorer
performance in the hidden condition, and a significant interaction
between group and condition, F(1, 53)  4.17, p  .046, r  .27.
Figure 2 illustrates this interaction effect.
In order to establish the source of this interaction effect,
follow-up t tests were conducted. Independent-samples t tests
revealed that, in the visible condition, there was no significant
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Figure 2. Mean proportion of time spent in the target quadrant (the
primary measure of navigation ability from the memory island task) for
each group in each condition (error bars represent  1 SE).
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difference between groups in proportion of time spent in the
target quadrant, t(53)  0.14, p  .887, Cohen’s d  0.05
(ASD: M  .80, SD  .19; comparison: M  .81, SD  .21).
However, in the hidden condition, participants with ASD spent
significantly less time in the target quadrant than comparison
participants, t(53)  2.22, p  .031, Cohen’s d  0.60 (ASD:
M  .69, SD  .21; comparison: M  .81, SD  .19).
Paired-samples t tests revealed that the ASD group spent sig-
nificantly more time in the target quadrant in the visible con-
dition than the hidden condition, t(26)  2.54, p  .017,
Cohen’s d  0.55. However, in the comparison group, there
was no significant difference in proportion of time spent in the
target quadrant between the conditions, t(27)  0.11, p  .910,
Cohen’s d  0.01.
Supplementary dependent measures. Descriptive and in-
ferential statistics for latency, proportion of successful trials,
velocity, and path length are reported in Table 2. These data
were analyzed using mixed-design ANOVAs, with group (ASD,
comparison) as the between-participants variable and condition
(visible, hidden) as the within-participants variable. However,
given that none of these supplementary dependent measures
were of central theoretical interest, we merely summarize the
results here.
These analyses revealed significant main effects of condition on
all measures, reflecting overall longer latency, lower proportion of
successful trials, higher velocity, and longer paths on hidden trials
than visible trials. There were significant and marginally signifi-
cant main effects of group on latency, proportion of successful
trials, and velocity, reflecting diminished performance among
ASD participants. Crucially, there were no significant interaction
effects on these supplementary measures, underscoring our argu-
ments regarding a general diminution of processing efficiency and
speed in ASD: Participants with ASD showed a longer latency,
lower velocity, and lower proportion of successful trials in both
conditions. Although there was no significant main effect of group
on path length, the interaction effect was marginally significant.
This may reflect the fact that the difference in path length between
participants with and without ASD was negligible in the visible
condition (d  0.15) but moderate in the hidden condition (d 
0.58)—participants with ASD took substantially longer paths in
this condition.
Correlations Between Navigation and Episodic
Memory, Episodic Future Thinking, and ToM
Correlation analyses were used to explore the relation between
navigation task performance and performance on (a) the episodic
memory task, (b) the episodic future thinking task, and (c) the
mentalizing (ToM) condition of the animations task. For these
analyses, the navigation measure used was proportion of time
spent in the target quadrant, given that this is the optimal measure
of this ability.
In the first set of analyses, we explored the simple bivariate
correlations between proportion of time spent in the target quad-
rant in the hidden condition and performance on the episodic
memory/future thinking task. Among the whole sample of partic-
ipants, the relation between navigation and episodic memory was
positive (but small) and significant, r  .26, p  .032. Within each
group separately, the association remained, but no longer reached
significance (ASD: r  .24, p  .124; comparison: r  .17, p 
.197).
The pattern of results concerning the relation between naviga-
tion and episodic future thinking was very similar: Again, it was
positive (but small) and approached significance, r  .21, p 
.065. Within each group separately, the association remained but
no longer reached significance (ASD: r  .23, p  .129; compar-
ison: r  .07, p  .361).
Table 2
Descriptive (Means and Standard Deviations) and Inferential (Group [ASD, Comparison]  Condition [Visible, Hidden] Mixed-
Design ANOVA) Statistics for Supplementary Memory Island Dependent Measures
Dependent measure Condition
Descriptive statistics Inferential statistics
ASD Comparison Total
Group Condition
Group 
Condition
F(1,53) p r F(1,53) p r F(1,53) p r
Latency to reach target (s) Visible 88.01 (39.13) 68.85 (28.51) 78.25 (35.17)
Hidden 105.40 (45.80) 77.11 (29.18) 91.00 (40.49)
Total 96.71 (43.09) 72.98 (28.88) 84.63 (38.29)
7.28 .009 .35 9.00 .004 .38 1.14 .291 .15
Proportion of successful trials Visible .84 (.22) .91 (.25) .88 (.24)
Hidden .72 (.24) .86 (.21) .79 (.23)
Total .78 (.24) .88 (.23) .83 (.24)
3.78 .057 .26 6.60 .013 .33 .97 .328 .13
Velocity (virtual units/s) Visible 7.16 (1.00) 7.88 (0.68) 7.53 (0.92)
Hidden 7.94 (0.67) 8.48 (0.52) 8.22 (0.65)
Total 7.55 (0.93) 8.18 (0.67) 7.87 (0.86)
12.46 .001 .44 66.89 .001 .75 1.07 .306 .14
Path length (virtual units) Visible 580.35 (280.62) 539.48 (257.57) 559.55 (267.42)
Hidden 808.62 (342.59) 640.65 (221.61) 723.11 (297.07)
Total 694.49 (330.88) 590.07 (243.48) 641.33 (293.08)
2.53 .118 .21 20.38 .001 .53 3.03 .087 .23
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
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In the next set of analyses, we explored the bivariate correlation
between proportion of time spent in the target quadrant on the
hidden condition of the memory island task and scores from the
mentalizing condition of animations task. This revealed a strong,
positive correlation within both groups analyzed together, r  .66,
p  .001, and within the ASD, r  .62, p  .001, and comparison
groups, r  .48, p  .005, alone. A Fisher’s z test indicated that the
difference between the coefficients produced by the two groups
was nonsignificant, z  0.70, p  .483.
In addition to the straightforward bivariate association between
navigation and ToM, we were also interested in the possible role
of any confounding factors in driving these correlations. Thus, we
conducted a set of partial correlation analyses to explore the
relation between (a) proportion of time spent in the target quadrant
on the hidden condition, and (b) scores from the mentalizing
condition of animations task, controlling for (c) proportion of time
spent in the target quadrant on the visible condition of the memory
island task, and (d) scores from the physical condition of anima-
tions task. This allowed us to filter out theoretically irrelevant
sources of shared variance (i.e., the effect of extraneous task
factors) from the analysis. Hence, this approach to analyzing the
data provides a relatively uncontaminated test of the relation
between ToM ability and navigation ability, independent of gen-
eral (non-survey-based navigation) requirements of the memory
island task and independent of general (non-ToM) demands inher-
ent in the animations task. Among the groups combined, the
correlation remained positive and moderately strong, rab.c.d  .40,
p  .002. When analyzed in each group separately, the correlation
remained significant among participants with ASD, rab.c.d  .51,
p  .006, but not among comparison participants, rab.c.d  .27,
p  .092. Nonetheless, the between-groups difference in the size
of the correlation was nonsignificant, Z  0.99, p  .322.
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to assess spatial navigation
ability among intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD.
Arguably, the study has several advantages over the few exist-
ing studies of this ability in ASD. First, it involved the largest
sample of participants with ASD (n  27) of any study of
spatial navigation in ASD to date, increasing confidence in the
reliability of the results. Second, participant groups in the
current study were matched very closely for sex, age, verbal IQ,
and performance IQ, ensuring that between-groups differences
in experimental (navigation) task performance are not merely
the product of differences between the groups in sex, age, or
intellectual ability. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this
study employed the only paradigm (the memory island task) to
date that necessitates a survey-based (cognitive-map-based)
navigation strategy.
In line with the primary hypothesis of the study, participants
with ASD spent a significantly smaller proportion of their time
in the target quadrant in the hidden condition of the memory
island task, indicating impairment in spatial navigation among
this group. In this respect, the difference between the groups
was associated with a moderate effect size (d  0.60). Cru-
cially, despite this moderate impairment among participants
with ASD in the hidden condition of the memory island task,
there was no sign of any reliable difference between the groups
in performance on the visible condition of the task. In this
respect, the difference between the groups was associated with
a negligible effect size (d  0.05). Thus, the diminished per-
formance of participants with ASD in the hidden condition was
not merely due to difficulties with noncentral task demands.
Rather, the problem was with survey-based navigation, specif-
ically. Participants with ASD also showed a trend toward taking
longer, less efficient paths when navigating in the hidden con-
dition only (also associated with a moderate effect size, d 
0.58)—that is, they had to cover more ground to locate the
target. In other words, participants with ASD were not only
searching in the wrong areas of the island but also traveling
further.
The current results contrast with those of Caron et al. (2004) and
Edgin and Pennington (2005), who reported intact or superior
navigation in ASD. Aside from differences in participant matching
procedures, this discrepancy is probably due to the fact that (de-
spite having impaired survey-based skills) individuals with ASD
have intact route-based navigation and visual pattern matching
skills, which are sufficient for success on the corridor and simple
virtual water mazes employed, respectively, in these studies.
Several limitations of the current study should be considered
when interpreting the results. First, although the sample size is
reasonable by the standards of most ASD research, it is neverthe-
less relatively small by the standards of psychology more gener-
ally. Second, the sample consisted exclusively of intellectually
high-functioning adults. Thus, we do not know how younger or
less cognitively able participants with ASD would perform on the
task. Finally, the current task employed a virtual environment.
Although navigation performance among typical individuals is
comparable across real-world and virtual settings, we do not know
if this is also true for individuals with ASD.
The current findings have implications for theory develop-
ment and for clinical practice. In terms of theory development,
the current results support the notion that navigation, episodic
memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM share a common
underlying basis among neurotypical individuals. The fact that
we observe deficits in all four of these abilities among individ-
uals with ASD is consistent with this idea, and adds weight to
the proposal that hippocampal functioning is atypical in ASD
(Bowler, Gaigg, & Lind, 2011). Although dissociations be-
tween these abilities could still potentially be observed in other
disorders, the finding that impairments across these domains
cohere in ASD is notable. Candidates for the shared underlying
basis of such impairments include diminished scene construc-
tion and/or diminished self-projection. However, because both
of these theories predict impairments in navigation among
people with ASD, the between-groups differences in experi-
mental task performance observed in the current study do not
allow us to distinguish between these theories. However, ex-
ploration of the cognitive correlates of navigation ability has the
potential to do just that.
Both the scene construction and self-projection theories predict
that navigation performance should be positively associated with
episodic memory and episodic future thinking. However, only the
self-projection theory implies that navigation ability should be
positively associated with ToM. The finding in the current study
that performance in the hidden condition of the memory island task
was strongly and significantly positively associated with perfor-
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mance on the mentalizing condition of the animations task among
both ASD and comparison participants supports the self-projection
theory specifically. It is notable that performance on the memory
island task was associated positively and significantly with per-
formance on the episodic memory task only when both groups
were collapsed, and not when each group was analyzed individu-
ally. However, the correlation among each group individually was
highly similar in magnitude to the correlation among both groups
collapsed. Therefore, the lack of statistical significance within
each group individually is likely to be a product merely of limited
statistical power. However, matters concerning the relation be-
tween navigation and episodic future thinking were less clear.
Although, the correlation approached significance among both
groups collapsed, it was modest in magnitude and only negligible
among comparison participants alone. The relation between epi-
sodic memory and episodic future thinking is well established, but
they are not synonymous (see Lind & Bowler, 2010). Thus, it is
quite possible that navigation and episodic memory share partic-
ular cognitive underpinnings, but these are distinct from the cog-
nitive underpinnings that are common to episodic memory and
episodic future thinking.
The current results have further theoretical implications, in that
they provide a challenge to the extreme male brain theory of ASD.
This theory predicts that people with ASD should manifest undi-
minished and even superior ability on tasks (requiring systemiz-
ing) that males consistently outperform females on. Spatial navi-
gation is perhaps the prototypical example of such a skill, with
overwhelming evidence of male superiority in this ability (Dabbs
et al., 1998; Jones et al., 2003). Thus, if ASD is an example of
(indeed, caused by) an extreme male brain, then people with this
disorder should perform at least as well as, if not better than,
neurotypical comparison individuals on navigation tasks. The fact
that, instead, they performed significantly less well than closely
matched neurotypical participants in the current study echoes
findings from recent studies that cast doubt on the validity of the
extreme male brain theory. For example, Pellicano et al. (2011)
explored large-scale search skills—which arguably rely on several
putative systemizing abilities, including navigation-related abili-
ties—within a laboratory-based “foraging room.” They found that
children with ASD were less systematic and less efficient at
foraging than typically developing comparison children. These
findings could be at least partially explained by difficulties with
navigation, and stand in clear contrast to the predictions of the
extreme male brain theory.
The current results, in themselves, do not imply that the extreme
male brain theory should necessarily be abandoned. They do,
however, suggest that it, or the broader empathizing–systemizing
theory of psychological sex differences among neurotypical indi-
viduals, may need some revision. If the empathizing-systemizing
theory is to be preserved as an explanation for psychological sex
differences, the idea that individuals with ASD have across-the-
board systemizing impairments and extreme male brains in every
respect needs to be rethought. Alternatively, if the extreme male
brain theory is to be preserved as an explanation of ASD, the
central notion of systemizing may need to be reconsidered. Spe-
cifically, navigation could no longer be classed as a systemizing
skill. It would follow that the Systemizing Quotient (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2003) would also require revision, to exclude the items that
relate to survey-based navigation (Items 31 [“I find it difficult to
learn my way around a new city”] and 49 [“I can easily visualize
how the motorways in my region link up”]).
In terms of the implications of the current results for our
understanding of the ASD phenotype, our observations fit with
frequent anecdotal reports that individuals with this disorder often
insist on sticking to well-known, familiar routes. This is typically
viewed as a manifestation of the behavioral inflexibility that is
diagnostic of the disorder. Therefore, our results provide an im-
portant potential explanation for this aspect of inflexible behavior,
namely, that individuals with ASD have difficulties with generat-
ing cognitive maps and rely more heavily than neurotypical indi-
viduals on route-based navigation skills. Hence, taking a new
route—even to a familiar location—may leave some individuals
with ASD feeling lost and uncertain of their location. This could
explain the high degree of anxiety experienced by some individ-
uals with ASD when required to deviate from familiar routes.
Therefore, a key clinical implication of the current findings is that
people with ASD may benefit from using external representations,
such as maps, to compensate for their difficulties with generating
cognitive maps of the environment. In addition to encouraging the
use of external representations to support navigation, it may be
possible to foster the ability to generate cognitive maps among
individuals with this disorder. There is evidence that purposeful
training of such strategies in virtual environments can transfer into
real-world benefits in navigation ability (Witmer, Sadowski, &
Finkelstein, 2002). Given that survey-based navigation is dimin-
ished in ASD, but not absent, it may (and, indeed, should) be
possible to foster existing capacity among individuals with this
disorder. The fact that spatial navigation is so critical for day-to-
day independent living suggests the potential benefits of such
interventions for those individuals with ASD who experience
difficulties with navigation in their daily lives may be quite sig-
nificant.
We have argued that deficits in scene construction and/or self-
projection in ASD may plausibly contribute to difficulties with
survey-based navigation—that is, we are suggesting that there are
impairments in the representational processes needed to generate
cognitive maps. However, it is important to consider whether
navigation difficulties may, alternatively (or additionally), stem
from lack of relevant sensory input. In other words, the direction
of causality may be the opposite of that assumed in the preceding
paragraph: Behavioral inflexibility (specifically, sticking to well-
known routes) may contribute to navigation impairments, as op-
posed to navigation impairments contributing to behavioral inflex-
ibility. Effective navigation relies on appropriate sensory input in
addition to the necessary representational apparatus. If a pervasive
“insistence on sameness” means that a child with ASD invariably
follows the same routes, they will only ever experience a limited
portion of their environments, restricting their opportunities for
learning about topographical layouts. Such attenuated sensory
input would inevitably result in impoverished cognitive maps of
real-world environments. Although it is not known whether the
representational processes that underpin cognitive maps can be
influenced by navigational experiences, it seems plausible to sup-
pose that inadequate sensory input could have adverse develop-
mental consequences on them—insufficient input may limit op-
portunities to practice generating richly detailed cognitive maps. In
relation to the current study, the results cannot be explained in
terms of inadequate online sensory input (because starting orien-
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tation was varied across trials, participants were prevented from
repeatedly following the same route), but this does not preclude the
possibility that insufficient sensory input in development has a
persistent impact on navigation into adulthood. Clearly, further
research will be required to elucidate these issues, but if this
analysis turns out to be correct, it highlights the importance of
intervening early in development.
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